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THE IMPACT OF ST CATHERINE’S MILLING
KAREN DRAKE1
OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL AT YORK UNIVERSITY
October 1, 2017
Note: This is the post-print version of a chapter that appears in Law Society of Upper Canada,
ed, Special Lectures 2017: Canada at 150: The Charter and the Constitution (Toronto: Irwin
Law and the Law Society of Upper Canada, 2017).

A

Introduction
St Catherine’s Milling may seem like a peculiar choice as one of the three constitutional

cases that helped to define Canada as a nation, given that most of the legal principles affirmed by
Lord Watson, writing for the Privy Council, have been overruled. This paper identifies the
principles from St Catherine’s Milling which are still good law, and argues that the logic that
underlies and shapes those principles is the logic of the doctrine of discovery and the principle of
terra nullius.
Jurists have articulated different versions of the doctrine of discovery and disagreed about
its precise requirements.2 At its essence, the doctrine allows a nation to acquire sovereignty over
foreign territory by being the first to discover it; on some versions, it was necessary to not only
discover but also effectively occupy the territory.3 Traditionally, this mode of acquiring
sovereignty applied only to terra nullius, that is, territory not yet possessed by a socially and
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Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School at York University. I would like to thank
Jessica Karjanmaa for her diligent research assistance and Kent McNeil for his helpful comments
on an earlier draft. Any errors are my responsibility alone.
2
See Robert J Miller, “The Doctrine of Discovery” in Robert J Miller et al, Discovering
Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010) 1 at 22 (arguing that “Europeans occasionally disagreed over the exact
meaning of Discovery, and even sometimes violently disputed their divergent claims; but one
principle they never disagreed about was that the Indigenous peoples and nations lost sovereign,
commercial, and real property rights immediately upon their ‘discovery’ by Europeans”). See
Karen Drake, The Answer, Not the Problem: An Examination of the Role of Aboriginal Rights in
Securing a Liberal Foundation for the Legitimacy of the Canadian State (LLM Thesis,
University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 2013) [unpublished] at 50-62 (identifying and analyzing
three different versions of the doctrine of discovery).
3
See John H Currie, Public International Law, 2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at 275.
1

politically organized community.4 Some European nations, however, deemed Indigenous
territories to be terrae nullius for the sake of asserting sovereignty over them by means of
discovery.5 Their rationale was the supposed inferiority of Indigenous peoples.6
The operation of the doctrine of discovery and the principle of terra nullius within St
Catherine’s Milling is not immediately apparent. Neither of these phrases appears in Lord
Watson’s decision. Nor does his decision contain any discussion of Marshall CJ’s trilogy
establishing the doctrine of discovery in American law, including Johnson v M’Intosh7 which has
been cited at length in modern Canadian decisions.8 Nor did Lord Watson explicitly accuse
Indigenous peoples of inferiority, as Chancellor Boyd did so openly in the trial decision.9 Yet, as
others have recognized, the doctrine of discovery is enmeshed within Lord Watson’s analysis.10
Canada has many things to be proud of during its sesquicentennial, but the doctrine of
discovery is not one of them. While Canadians rightfully celebrate our many accomplishments,
the doctrine of discovery remains our national shame. This state of affairs is not unavoidable.
Our elected governments have it within their power to repudiate the doctrine of discovery and
expunge its implications from Canadian law. As citizens, we have it within our power to hold our
governments accountable for laws that perpetuate prejudice instead of embodying principles of
equality, consent, and respect.
4

See Currie, ibid; Drake, supra note 2 at 48.
See Miller, supra note 2 at 21.
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See Miller, ibid at 8; MF Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in
International Law: Being a Treatise on the Law and Practice Relating to Colonial Expansion
(New York: Nego Universities Press, 1969) at 18-19; Johnson v M’Intosh (1823), 8 Wheaton
543 at 576, 21 US 543 (USSC) [Johnson v M’Intosh].
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Johnson v M’Intosh, ibid.
8
See especially Guerin v Canada, [1984] 2 SCR 335 at 378, Dickson J [Guerin]; R v Van der
Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 at paras 35-36, 49 Lamer CJ [Van der Peet]; Mitchell v MNR, 2001 SCC
33 at paras 112-13, Binnie J, minority opinion. See also R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at
1103 (holding that “there was from the outset never any doubt that sovereignty and legislative
power, and indeed the underlying title, to such lands vested in the Crown” and citing Johnson v
M'Intosh, supra note 6, as support for this proposition) [Sparrow]; Tsilhqot'in Nation v British
Columbia, 2012 BCCA 285 at para 166.
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R v St Catharines Milling and Lumber Company (1885), 10 OR 196 (Ch) [St Catharines
Milling Trial Decision].
10
See Leroy Little Bear, “A Concept of Native Title: The Legal Terms in the Battle for Land”
(summer 1977) Awkesasne Notes 28; Tracey Lindberg, “The Doctrine of Discovery in Canada”
in Robert J Miller et al, Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English
Colonies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 89 at 120-21.
5

2

B

Two Paradigms: Doctrine of Discovery or Equality of Peoples
Many scholars have recognized that the doctrine of discovery is the explanation and

justification for Canada’s assertion of sovereignty endorsed within Canadian law. These scholars
have criticized this justification because it depends on a deep inequality; it asserts the inferiority
of some humans and the superiority of other humans.11 Many have also noted that the doctrine of
discovery is inconsistent with the actions of representatives of the British government, who
entered into nation-to-nation relationships with Indigenous peoples, as illustrated by the Treaty
of Niagara.12 In recent years, the Supreme Court of Canada has seemed less willing to endorse
the doctrine of discovery, perhaps because of these critiques. Felix Hoehn identifies the Court’s
reluctance in terms of a paradigm shift in the Aboriginal rights jurisprudence, in which the Court
begins to distance itself from the doctrine of discovery paradigm and instead affirms a new
paradigm based on the principle of equality of peoples.13 Building on the work of Brian Slattery,
Hoehn argues that this shift is most vividly illustrated by the Court’s description of the Crown’s
assertion of sovereignty in the absence of treaties with Aboriginal peoples as de facto as opposed
to de jure, which means legitimate or rightful.14 According to Slattery, the Court’s “language
suggests that the Crown’s claims of sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples will continue to be
11

See e.g. Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims” (1991) 29 Osgoode
Hall LJ 681; Patrick Macklem, “Normative Dimensions of an Aboriginal Right of SelfGovernment” (1995- 1996) 21 Queen's LJ 173 at 187-88; James Sákéj Youngblood Henderson,
"Postcolonial Indigenous Legal Consciousness" (2002) 1 Indigenous LJ 1 at 38 (arguing that
judicial decisions establishing and affirming the doctrine of discovery “should have no judicial
authority in postcolonial law; they are unconscionable and represent the prejudice and bias of
another legal era”); Lindberg, supra note 10 at 94; John Borrows, “The Durability of Terra
Nullius: Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia” (2015) 48:3 UBC L Rev 701 at 723-26
[Borrows, “Durability”].
12
See John Borrows, “Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History,
and Self-Government” in Michael Asch, ed, Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on
Law, Equity, and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) [Borrows, “Wampum at
Niagara”].
13
Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: Native
Law Centre, University of Saskatchewan, 2012) at 1-2.
14
Hoehn, ibid at 34, citing Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73
at para 32 [Haida Nation]; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project
Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74 at para 42 [Taku River]; Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights
and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 29 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 433 at 437-38 [Slattery, “Honour of
the Crown”].
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legally deficient until there has been a just settlement of their rights through negotiated
treaties.”15 Indeed, the Court in Haida Nation describes treaties as doing the heavy lifting within
the project of justifying the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty: “Treaties serve to reconcile preexisting Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty”.16 Similarly, a few paragraphs
later, the Court states: “Many bands reconciled their claims with the sovereignty of the Crown
through negotiated treaties.”17 This new paradigm is also reflected in the following statement
from a majority of the Court in Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation: “Historically,
treaties were the means by which the Crown sought to reconcile the Aboriginal inhabitants of
what is now Canada to the assertion of European sovereignty over the territories traditionally
occupied by First Nations.”18 The Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent Aboriginal title
decision, Tsilhqot’in,19 seems to confirm Hoehn’s thesis. In this decision, the Court explicitly
rejects the concept of terra nullius: “The doctrine of terra nullius (that no one owned the land
prior to European assertion of sovereignty) never applied in Canada, as confirmed by the Royal
Proclamation (1763)”.20 Thus, this emerging paradigm provides that the legitimacy of the
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty is grounded within treaties with Aboriginal peoples, rather than
in the doctrine of discovery.
This raises the question of the interpretation and significance of treaties. There are at least
two different ways in which treaties could legitimate the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty,
neither of which presupposes or affirms the doctrine of discovery. On the one hand, treaties can
be understood as agreements to share the land on a nation-to-nation basis, as opposed to a
surrender of land or sovereignty. On this view, treaties do not subordinate the sovereignty of
Indigenous peoples to that of the Crown. Rather the Crown sovereignty that is legitimated by the
treaties is a shared sovereignty. The research of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
reveals that this is the understanding of the so-called historical land surrender treaties held by

15

Slattery, “Honour of the Crown”, ibid at 438, cited by Hoehn, supra note 13 at 34.
Haida Nation, supra note 14 at para 20, cited by Hoehn, supra note 13 at 35 and by Slattery,
“Honour of the Crown”, supra note 14 at 438.
17
Haida Nation, supra note 14 at para 25, cited by Hoehn, supra note 13 at 35.
18
Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 at para 8. See also Hoehn,
supra note 13 at 71-72 (discussing the way in which this decision supports the new paradigm
based on equality and treaties).
19
Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 [Tsilhqot’in].
20
Tsilhqot’in, ibid at para 69.
16
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most, if not all, Indigenous treaty signatories in Canada.21 This view is consistent with the Gus
Wen Tah—or Two Row Wampum—exchanged between the Haudenosaunee and the British, and
with the Treaty of Niagara as reflected in the Covenant Chain belt exchanged between the
Anishinaabe and the British.22 On this view, the Treaty of Niagara informs the interpretation of
subsequent treaties executed by those at Niagara in 1764.23 This view is also consistent with
Hoehn’s vision of a new paradigm based on equality of peoples,24 and it is endorsed by the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, whose 45th Call to Action calls on Canada “to jointly develop
with Aboriginal peoples a Royal Proclamation of Reconciliation to be issued by the Crown. The
proclamation would build on the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and the Treaty of Niagara of 1764,
and reaffirm the nation-to-nation relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown.”25
On the other hand, treaties can be understood as a surrender of sovereignty. At
international law, treaties can effect a surrender of sovereignty in two contexts: as a concomitant
to conquest or as a standalone surrender of sovereignty. According to the doctrine of conquest,
the victor in war is entitled to claim sovereignty over the conquered people and their territory.26
When conquest was still accepted as a means of acquiring sovereignty at international law,27 a
vanquished nation would sometimes execute a treaty of cession which acknowledged the

21

See Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Restructuring the Relationship, vol 2 (Ottawa:
Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 40. See also Harold Cardinal & Walter Hildebrandt,
Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream Is That Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly
Recognized as Nations (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2013) at 15.
22
See Borrows, “Wampum at Niagara”, supra note 12; Mark D Walters, “Rights and Remedies
within Common Law and Indigenous Legal Traditions: Can the Covenant Chain be Judicially
Enforced Today?” in John Borrows & Michael Coyle, eds, The Right Relationship: Reimagining
the Implementation of Historical Treaties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017) 187.
23
See Borrows, “Wampum at Niagara”, supra note 12 at 167.
24
Hoehn, supra note 13 at 148-50 (although Hoehn prefers the term “sharing” over “shared”
sovereignty: 149-50).
25
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of
Canada: Calls to Action (Winnipeg: TRCC, 2015), online: <www.trc.ca/
websites/trcinstitution/File/2015/Findings/Calls_to_Action_English2.pdf> [TRC, Calls to
Action].
26
See Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in
International Law and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 8.
27
See Currie, supra note 3 at 279-80 (explaining that since at least the Second World War and
possibly the early part of the twentieth century, conquest is no longer a valid principle of
international law).
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conquest and surrendered the vanquished nation’s sovereignty to the victor.28 Cession, which is
another recognized means of acquiring sovereignty, refers to “the transfer of sovereignty over
territory pursuant to agreement between the ceding and acquiring states.”29 In other words, a
nation can cede sovereignty to another nation through a treaty even without a conquest having
first occurred. According to this view, treaties, such as the historical land surrender treaties,
legitimate the Crown’s sovereignty because the Indigenous signatories ceded their sovereignty to
the Crown in those treaties.
Neither of these views—neither the shared sovereignty view nor the surrender of
sovereignty view—operates within the doctrine of discovery paradigm. Rather, they both assume
the equality of Indigenous peoples insofar as they affirm that Indigenous peoples who entered
into treaties were sovereign and thus were able to agree to either share sovereignty or surrender
their sovereignty. The remainder of this paper seeks to determine whether the aspects of the St.
Catherine’s Milling decision which are still good law support either of these two views or
whether they operate within the doctrine of discovery paradigm. To answer this question, it is
necessary to first examine the decision in St. Catherine’s Milling and to determine which aspects
of it are still good law.
C

The Case
In 1883, the St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company (the Company) cut

approximately 2,000,000 feet of timber around Wabigoon Lake in northwestern Ontario pursuant
to a licence granted by the Dominion government.30 The Ontario government took issue with the
licence, arguing that the land where the timber was cut belonged to Ontario, not the Dominion
government, and thus only Ontario had authority to issue such a licence.31 The trial judge,
Chancellor Boyd, held in favour of Ontario.32 Each of the Company’s appeals—to the Ontario

28

See Korman, supra note 26 at 123.
See Currie, supra note 3 at 283.
30
St Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v Ontario (AG) (1888), 14 App Cas 46 (PC) at
47 [St Catherine's Milling PC]; St Catharines Milling Trial Decision, supra note 9 at 197.
31
St Catherine's Milling PC, supra note 30 at 47.
32
St Catharines Milling Trial Decision, supra note 9 at 235.
29
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Court of Appeal,33 to the Supreme Court of Canada,34 and to the Privy Council35—was
dismissed.
The outcome of the case, as well as the arguments of both the parties and the Dominion
government as intervener before the Privy Council,36 hinged on the existence and nature of
Indian title (now referred to as ‘Aboriginal title’).37 The area where the cutting occurred was
within the territory covered by Treaty Three, which had been executed in 1873.38 According to
the written text of Treaty Three,
The Saulteaux Tribe of the Ojibbeway Indians and all other the Indians
inhabiting the district hereinafter described and defined, do hereby cede,
release, surrender and yield up to the Government of the Dominion of
Canada for Her Majesty the Queen and Her successors forever, all their
rights, titles and privileges whatsoever, to the lands included within the
[boundaries described in the treaty].39
The Company and the Dominion government argued that prior to entering into Treaty Three, the
First Nation signatories held “absolute title”, or in other words, “a complete proprietary interest”
in their land which was limited only “by an imperfect power of alienation.”40 In other words,
Indian title is almost equivalent to a fee simple estate in land; the difference is that Indian title is
alienable only to the Crown. The effect of Treaty Three’s surrender provision, reproduced above,
was to transfer the First Nations’ proprietary interest from the First Nations to the Crown in right
of the Dominion.41 That is, the written words of the surrender provision explicitly state that the

33

St Catharines Milling and Lumber Co v R, 1886 CanLII 30 (ONCA).
St Catharines Milling and Lumber Co v R, (1887) 13 SCR 577.
35
St Catherine's Milling PC, supra note 30.
36
St Catherine's Milling PC, ibid at 47, 53.
37
But see Mark D Walters, “The Aboriginal Charter of Rights: The Royal Proclamation of 1763
and the Constitution of Canada” in Terry Fenge & Jim Aldrige, eds, Keeping Promises – The
Royal Proclamation of 1763, Aboriginal Rights and Treaties in Canada (Quebec: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2015) 50 at 61-62 (explaining that the St Catherine’s Milling case was
“as much about the vision of federalism that would prevail in Canada as about the nature of
Aboriginal title”) [Walters, “Aboriginal Charter”].
38
Treaty 3 between Her Majesty the Queen and the Saulteaux Tribe of the Ojibbeway Indians at
the Northwest Angle on the Lake of the Woods with Adhesions, online: Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development Canada <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028675/1100100028679>
[Treaty Three].
39
Treaty Three, ibid.
40
St Catherine's Milling PC, supra note 30 at 48, 49.
41
St Catherine's Milling PC, ibid at 47, 49.
34
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First Nations have ceded their title to their land “to the Government of the Dominion of Canada”.
Ontario was not a party to the treaty, the text of the treaty does not refer to Ontario as a recipient
of title, and the Dominion government provided the consideration for the transfer of Indian
title.42 According to this line of reasoning, given that title was transferred to the Dominion
government, the Dominion government was entitled to issue a licence allowing the Company to
cut timber on the land.
Ontario denied that Indian title is an “absolute title”, as claimed by the Dominion.43
Rather, ‘Indian title’ is no more than a moral claim to occupy the land, which was extinguished
by Treaty Three.44 The underlying title to the land, both before and after Treaty Three was
executed, was held by the Crown.45 As between the province and the Dominion, the underlying
title was held by the Crown in right of Ontario pursuant to various provisions of the British
North America Act,46 including section 109,47 which provides for provincial ownership of lands
within the four original post-confederation provinces.48 On this line of reasoning, Treaty Three
did not transfer title to the Dominion government because the First Nation signatories never had
any legal or equitable interest that could be transferred in the first place.49 As others have noted,
the positions, perspectives, and arguments of the First Nations who signed Treaty Three were not
considered by any level of court in St Catherine’s Milling, given that First Nations took no part
in the case, as neither parties, nor interveners, nor witnesses.50
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St Catherine's Milling PC, ibid at 47, 49; St Catharines Milling Trial Decision, supra note 9 at
198.
43
St Catherine's Milling PC, ibid at 49.
44
St Catherine's Milling PC, ibid; St Catharines Milling Trial Decision, supra note 9 at 199.
45
St Catherine's Milling PC, ibid.
46
Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II No 5, ss
108, 117 [Constitution Act, 1867].
47
Constitution Act, 1867, ibid, s 109.
48
St Catharines Milling Trial Decision, supra note 9 at 200.
49
St Catherine's Milling PC, supra note 30 at 49; St Catharines Milling Trial Decision, supra
note 9 at 199.
50
See Kent McNeil, “Social Darwinism and Judicial Conceptions of Indian Title in Canada in
the 1880s” (1999) 38:1 J West 68 at 69 (explaining that “…the sole witness in the case was
Alexander Morris, one of the Canadian commissioners who had negotiated the treaty”) [McNeil,
“Social Darwinism”]; D’Arcy Vermette, “Colonialism and the Suppression of Aboriginal Voice”
(2008-2009) 40:2 Ottawa Law Review 225 at p 231-32. For a discussion of First Nations’
perspectives on Treaty Three, see Sara J Mainville, “Treaty Councils and Mutual Reconciliation
Under Section 35” (2007) 6 Indigenous LJ 141.
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The trial judge endorsed Ontario’s reasoning, including, as others have noted, Ontario’s
rationale for denying that Indian title was a transferable legal or equitable right.51 Put simply,
Indian title was less than a proprietary interest because of the inferiority of First Nations.52
Chancellor Boyd was not shy about articulating this rationale; he wrote: “As heathens and
barbarians it was not thought that they had any proprietary title to the soil, nor any such claim
thereto as to interfere with…the general prosecution of colonization.”53 Throughout his decision,
Chancellor Boyd described First Nations as “untaught”, “uncivilized” and “rude red-men” who
live in a “primitive state”.54 Kent McNeil argues that Chancellor Boyd’s reasoning was based not
on facts but on racist stereotypes embedded within the social Darwinism which was popular at
the time and which gave those racist stereotypes a veneer of scientific validity.55 For example,
McNeil explains:
It is also plain that [Chancellor Boyd’s] views of Indians in general, and
of the Saulteaux [who signed Treaty 3] in particular, were based on racist
stereotypes rather than on facts. Referring to the Saulteaux of the Treaty
3 area, he admitted that “little is known of the people in this remote
region.” And yet he was able to conclude that they were “a more than
usually degraded Indian type.”56

51

St Catharines Milling Trial Decision, supra note 9 at 234-35. See Anthony J Hall, “The St.
Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company versus the Queen: Indian Land Rights as a Factor in
Federal-Provincial Relations in Nineteenth-Century Canada” in Kerry Abel & Jean Friesen, eds,
Aboriginal Resource Use in Canada: Historical and Legal Aspects (Manitoba: University of
Manitoba Press, 1991) 267 at 275 (explaining that Ontario’s argument rested on the notion that
First Nations were too primitive to have a proprietary interest in their land, given that property is
a “creature of law”, but First Nations were lawless and so they could “not be regarded
as…capable of holding lands”); McNeil, “Social Darwinism”, supra note 50 at 73.
52
St Catharines Milling Trial Decision, supra note 9 at 206. See McNeil, “Social Darwinism”,
supra note 50 at 73 (explaining that the trial judge “regarded the Indians as inferior, and that was
the main reason they had no land rights apart from the reserves”).
53
St Catharines Milling Trial Decision, supra note 9 at 206.
54
St Catharines Milling Trial Decision, ibid at 211, 230. See also McNeil, “Social Darwinism”,
supra note 50 at 73 (summarizing the epithets applied by the trial judge to First Nations).
55
McNeil, “Social Darwinism”, supra note 50 at 72, 73. See also Hall, supra note 51 at 277.
56
McNeil, “Social Darwinism”, supra note 50 at 73. See also Sidney L Harring, White Man’s
Law: Native People in Nineteenth-Century Canadian Jurisprudence (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1998) at 138 (explaining that
the trial judge gave “no indication of what, in his view, made these Indians more ‘degraded’ than
others or what legal purpose was served by his description”).
9

Donald Smith illustrates that the North West Resistance also contributed to the backdrop of the
St Catherine’s Milling trial.57 In the spring of 1885, just before the start of the trial, Chancellor
Boyd’s two oldest sons—Alex and Leonard—volunteered to fight on the side of the Canadians,
against the First Nations and Métis.58 Alex fought at Cut Knife Hill, where eight Canadians were
killed and fourteen wounded.59 Smith notes that by the time the St Catherine’s Milling trial
began, “Poundmaker and Big Bear still remained at large”, and during the period when
Chancellor Boyd was writing his decision, his sons were still away from home.60
The Privy Council’s decision, delivered by Lord Watson, employed the same logic as
Ontario’s arguments and Chancellor Boyd’s analysis, although Lord Watson’s reliance on
derogatory stereotypes was not explicit.61 According to Lord Watson, title to the relevant land
was always—both before and after Treaty Three was executed—held by the Crown.62 By virtue
of section 109 of the British North America Act, title was held by the Crown in right of Ontario,
not the Dominion.63 The First Nations did not hold title to the land, even before they signed
Treaty Three. Instead, their Indian ‘title’ was merely a “personal and usufructuary right”.64 Lord
Watson declined to explain this phrase; the Privy Council did “not consider it necessary to
express any opinion” on “the precise quality of the Indian right”.65 Whatever else Lord Watson
might have meant, he concluded that Indian title is inalienable; it is not the kind of right that can
be sold or transferred.66 It can only be extinguished, by surrender to the Crown or otherwise.67
Thus, the Dominion government did not receive title to the land delineated within Treaty Three
because before Treaty Three was executed, Ontario already had title to the land in question; Lord

57

Donald Smith, “Aboriginal Rights a Century Ago: The St Catharines Milling Case of 1885
Hardened Attitudes toward Native Land Claims”, The Beaver (February/March 1987) 4 at 9-10.
See also Harring, supra note 56 at 138.
58
Smith, supra note 57 at 9-10, 11.
59
Smith, ibid at 10.
60
Smith, ibid at 10, 11.
61
Walters, “Aboriginal Charter”, supra note 37 at 62 (explaining that “Lord Watson, speaking
for the Judicial Committee [of the Privy Council], did not adopt the extreme views of judges like
Boyd”).
62
St Catherine's Milling PC, supra note 30 at 55, 58.
63
St Catherine's Milling PC, ibid at 57-58.
64
St Catherine's Milling PC, ibid at 54.
65
St Catherine's Milling PC, ibid at 55.
66
St Catherine's Milling PC, ibid at 54.
67
St Catherine's Milling PC, ibid at 55.
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Watson describes the province’s title as “a substantial and paramount estate” and as “a present
proprietary estate in the land”, which underlies the Indian title.68 The Indian title is “a mere
burden” on the province’s title.69 The effect of Treaty Three (and presumably all other so-called
land surrender treaties) is not to transfer anything but merely to remove this burden; as a result,
the province’s title becomes “a plenum dominium”—or unencumbered by the burden of Indian
title—whenever Indian title is extinguished, for example by surrender through a treaty.70 Even
though the Dominion government executed Treaty Three and provided the remuneration to the
First Nation signatories, it received nothing from the deal because the Treaty simply erased the
burden of Indian title, leaving the province with an unblemished title. Accordingly, Lord Watson
concluded that Ontario must relieve the Dominion government of the Crown’s treaty’s
obligations.71
D

The Impact of St Catherine’s Milling
Almost none of the legal principles enshrined within the Privy Council’s decision are still

good law.72 This section shows how three of these principles have been overruled by subsequent
jurisprudence. The first principle is that the source of Indian title is the Royal Proclamation,
1763, the second is that Indian title is a personal and usufructuary right, and the third is that
Indian title is dependent on the good will of the sovereign. I then argue that the key principle
from St Catherine’s Milling which remains good law is the doctrine of discovery, including the
concomitant principle that what is now Canada was terra nullius when Europeans first arrived
here. These two principles profoundly shaped, and continue to shape, Canada as a nation. They
are what make Canada a colonial nation not only historically but also now, at this moment.
1)

The Source of Indian title is the Royal Proclamation, 1763

68

St Catherine's Milling PC, ibid at 55, 58.
St Catherine's Milling PC, ibid at 58.
70
St Catherine's Milling PC, ibid at 55.
71
St Catherine's Milling PC, ibid at 60.
72
See Harring, supra note 56 at 147.
69
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Lord Watson held that the source of Indian title is the Royal Proclamation, 1763.73 As
such, the other aspects of Lord Watson’s analysis, discussed above, are derived from his
interpretation of the text of the Royal Proclamation, 1763. More importantly, this principle
means that Aboriginal rights are not common law rights,74 and so if not for the Royal
Proclamation, 1763, First Nations would have had no rights or interests in their territory.75 Put
differently, St Catherine’s Milling stands for the principle that Aboriginal title is a contingent
right, as opposed to an inherent right. Michael Asch and Patrick Macklem explain that according
to a contingent rights approach, the existence of Aboriginal rights—including Aboriginal title—
is contingent on legislative, executive, or constitutional recognition.76 According to an inherent
rights approach, in contrast, Aboriginal rights exist “independently of the legal creation of
Canada and [do] not [require] explicit legislative or executive recognition for their existence.”77
Instead, inherent rights are common law rights.78
The notion that Aboriginal title is a contingent right which owes its existence to the Royal
Proclamation, 1763 has been rejected by subsequent jurisprudence,79 including by both Judson J

73

St Catherine's Milling PC, supra note 30 at 54 (holding that “[t]heir possession, such as it was,
can only be ascribed to the general provisions made by the royal proclamation in favour of all
Indian tribes then living under the sovereignty and protection of the British Crown”). See
Gordon Christie, “A Colonial Reading of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow, Delgamuukw and
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and Hall J in Calder,80 by Dickson J in Guerin,81 and by the majority and the minority in
Delgamuukw.82 Although Aboriginal title is sui generis insofar as “its characteristics cannot be
completely explained by reference either to the common law rules of real property or to the rules
of property found in aboriginal legal systems”,83 it is a common law right insofar as its existence
is not contingent on legislative or executive recognition.84
2)

Indian Title is a Personal and Usufructuary Right

Lord Watson also held that Indian title is a personal and usufructuary right.85 Although he
left the nuances of this characterization unexplained, subsequent cases and commentators
provide guidance. The term ‘personal’ has been interpreted to mean at least two things: first, that
Indian title is not a property right and thus does not benefit from the traditional common law
protections for property rights,86 and second, that Indian title is inalienable such that it can only
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be surrendered to the Crown.87 The term ‘usufructuary’ comes from Roman law and refers to a
right to use something without having complete ownership of it.88
These principles have been modified or rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada’s
Aboriginal title jurisprudence. The “personal and usufructuary” characterization was critiqued by
Judson J in Calder,89 by Dickson J in Guerin,90 and by the majority in Delgamuukw.91 Justice
Dickson explains that the term “personal” is “somewhat inaccurate” insofar as the nature of
Indian title is not “completely exhausted by the concept of a personal right.”92 Indian title is
personal in the sense that it is inalienable,93 but it is more accurately characterized as sui
generis—or unique—given that upon surrender, the Crown is subject to a fiduciary duty to “deal
with the land for the benefit of the surrendering Indians.”94
McNeil documents additional Supreme Court of Canada decisions holding that
“Aboriginal title is only ‘personal’ in the sense of being inalienable”, but not in the sense of
being non-proprietary.95 As McNeil explains, although Aboriginal title is sui generis, the case
law establishes that “it is a proprietary interest in land that stands on an equal footing and is
entitled to the same respect as common law interests such as fee simple estates.”96
Turning to the term ‘usufructuary’, the content of Aboriginal title is no longer limited to a
mere license to use the land; the Supreme Court of Canada in Tsilhqot’in held that “Aboriginal
title confers ownership rights similar to those associated with fee simple, including: the right to
decide how the land will be used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy of the land; the right to
87
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possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of the land; and the right to pro-actively use
and manage the land.”97 To summarize, the notion that Aboriginal title is nothing more than a
non-proprietary right to use the land is no longer good law, and while it is still personal in the
sense of being inalienable, it is also unique insofar as a surrender of Aboriginal title gives rise to
a fiduciary duty on the part of the Crown.
3)

Indian Title is Dependent on the Good Will of the Sovereign

Finally, Lord Watson held that Indian title is “dependent on the good will of the
Sovereign.”98 McNeil explains that “[s]ome Canadian judges have taken this to mean that
Aboriginal title is subject to the will of the Crown, and so is extinguishable by the executive
without legislative authorization.”99 If this is the meaning of Lord Watson’s phrase, then his
statement is no longer good law, as it is inconsistent with principles subsequently affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Canada. In Sparrow, the Supreme Court established that prior to April 17,
1982 when section 35(1) came into force, Aboriginal rights—which includes title—could be
extinguished by competent legislation; to effect an extinguishment, the legislation must have
exhibited a clear and plain intention to extinguish the Aboriginal right.100 As McNeil explains,
this high threshold for extinguishment follows from the characterization of Aboriginal title as a
property right, which can “only be unilaterally extinguished by or pursuant to clear and plain
legislation.”101 The notion of unilateral extinguishment by the executive was coherent as long as
Aboriginal title was non-proprietary, but not once the Court affirmed the proprietary nature of
Aboriginal title.102
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To summarize, Lord Watson’s conclusions that Indian title (i) owes its existence to the
Royal Proclamation, 1763, (ii) is personal and usufructuary, and (iii) is dependent on the good
will of the sovereign, have all been rejected or modified.
4)

Indian Title is a Burden on the Crown’s Underlying Title

The aspect of Lord Watson’s reasoning which has not been overruled, and which was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Tsilhqot’in, is the principle that even before any socalled land surrender treaty was executed, the Crown in right of the province held underlying
title to the land, and Aboriginal title was a mere burden on the Crown’s underlying title. As
discussed above, Lord Watson describes the Crown’s title as “a substantial and paramount
estate” and “a present proprietary estate” which is “underlying the Indian title”.103 The Indian
title is a burden on the Crown’s underlying title which becomes a “plenum dominium” when the
Indian title is extinguished.104 Although Tsilhqot’in no longer describes the content of the
Crown’s underlying title in terms of “a substantial and paramount estate” or “a present
proprietary estate”, it affirms the logic from St Catherine's Milling depicting Aboriginal title as a
burden on the Crown’s already existing underlying title: “At the time of assertion of European
sovereignty, the Crown acquired radical or underlying title to all the land in the province. This
Crown title, however, was burdened by the pre-existing legal rights of Aboriginal people who
occupied and used the land prior to European arrival.”105 Later the Court reiterates that
Aboriginal title is “a burden on the underlying title asserted by the Crown at sovereignty.”106
The characterization of Aboriginal title confirmed in Tsilhqot’in coheres with the
principle of the inalienability of Aboriginal title. There is no need for a treaty to transfer title
from Aboriginal peoples to the Crown because the Crown already has underlying title to all land
in Canada by virtue of having asserted sovereignty over it. Instead, treaties merely extinguish or
erase the burden attached to the Crown’s underlying title, thereby leaving the Crown with an
unblemished title. The Court in Tsilhqot’in affirmed the inalienability of Aboriginal title,
although its language could be more precise. The Court states that Aboriginal title “cannot be
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alienated except to the Crown”.107 This statement seems to imply that Aboriginal title can be
alienated (but only to the Crown), as opposed to the principle that it can only be surrendered. It is
unlikely, though, that the Court meant for this obiter dicta to effect a change in the law,
especially given its renewed commitment to the depiction of Aboriginal title as a burden on the
Crown’s already-existing underlying title. The logic underlying the image of the Crown holding
an already-existing underlying title suggests that this title can be perfected by removing any
burdens, rather than by transferring anything from another party to the Crown. Accordingly, the
Court’s statement here is more likely an instance of imprecise language.
E

The Doctrine of Discovery Paradigm
Which paradigm does the logic introduced in St. Catherine’s Milling and confirmed in

Tsilhqot’in fall within: the doctrine of discovery paradigm or the equality paradigm? This section
argues that it falls within the former, given the principle that Aboriginal title is a mere burden on
the Crown’s already existing and underlying title. According to this logic, the Crown acquired
the radical or underlying title to land when it asserted sovereignty, which occurred prior to
executing any treaty.108 When the Crown does finally execute a treaty, the treaty is not capable of
either establishing a sharing of sovereignty or of extinguishing the sovereignty of Aboriginal
peoples, because Aboriginal peoples do not have sovereignty at this point, according to this
logic. Rather, all that Aboriginal peoples have, even before executing a treaty, is a burden on the
Crown’s underlying title. This burden is not the kind of thing that can be transferred; the effect of
the treaty is merely to extinguish the burden. Thus, what Aboriginal peoples were surrendering in
the numbered treaties was not their sovereignty. In other words, not only were the treaties not a
cession of sovereignty according to the Indigenous perspective, they also were not a cession of
sovereignty according to the British/Canadian perspective reflected within the common law.
Modern narratives that claim that Canada’s sovereignty can be grounded in Aboriginal
surrenders of sovereignty in the treaties are thus revisionist and based on an inaccurate
understanding of the actual legal framework articulated in St Catherine’s Milling and confirmed
in Tsilhqot’in.
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One might still wonder whether the St Catherine’s Milling/Tsilhqot’in logic requires that
the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty—which gives rise to its radical, underlying title—
necessarily was based on discovery, or whether it could have been based on one of the other
modes of acquiring sovereignty, such as prescription or conquest.109 Prescription provides that a
state can gain sovereignty over foreign territory by, among other things, effectively occupying
that territory for a sufficiently long period of time, even if the territory is already occupied.110
This could not have been the means by which the Crown acquired sovereignty prior to
extinguishing the burden of Aboriginal title in the treaties, because the Crown did not exercise
effective control over the land in question prior to executing many of the so-called historical land
surrender treaties. This is particularly true with respect to Treaty Three. The very reason the
Dominion government entered into Treaty Three was because it was obligated—pursuant to
section 11 of the British Columbia Terms of Union—to build a railway connecting British
Columbia to central Canada;111 however, the Dominion was not capable of building the railway
through what would become Treaty Three territory without the consent of the Indigenous
peoples who controlled the territory. In describing the situation on the ground just before Treaty
Three was executed, the trial judge in Keewatin held:
By 1873, the security of travellers over the Dawson Route and of
surveyors preparing for the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway
("CPR") was a concern. Canada feared it would have to incur the costs of
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stationing troops in the area. The CPR needed to be completed between
the Red River and Lake Superior by December 31, 1876.112
Similarly, the trial judge in Daniels found as a fact that the Indigenous population “stood in the
way” of the railway construction insofar as those constructing the railway were subject to attack
by Indigenous people.113 In order for construction of the railway to proceed, it was necessary to
maintain “peaceful relations” with the Indigenous population.114 This was accomplished by
executing the numbered treaties. Specifically, the expert evidence in Keewatin indicated that the
Dominion’s reason for executing Treaty Three was to secure “the as yet unceded territory of the
Saulteaux” which the railway would need to pass through.115 Thus, for whatever reason,
stationing troops along the railway route in order to protect those building the railway from
attack by Indigenous peoples was not a feasible option for Canada. Canada needed to get the
consent of Indigenous peoples through treaties in order to proceed with railway construction. In
other words, Canada was not in effective control of the relevant territory prior to executing
Treaty Three.
The other potentially relevant mode of acquiring sovereignty is conquest, discussed
above.116 In his decision, Lord Watson acknowledged Britain’s conquest of France’s territories
in the Seven Years’ War, which included the territory at issue in St Catherine’s Milling.117 Did
Britain also acquire sovereignty vis-à-vis Aboriginal peoples by means of its conquest of
France’s colonies? This question must be answered in the negative, given the logic of St
Catherine’s Milling and Tsilhqot’in. According to the common law, when Britain effected a
conquest, the law of the conquered people continued in force until altered by legislation.118 The
common law did not provide that conquest transformed the laws of a conquered people into the
kind of burden on the Crown’s underlying title which could later be extinguished through treaty.
As discussed above, treaties of surrender were sometimes executed concomitantly with conquest,
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but this was done shortly after the conquest occurred and what was surrendered was the
sovereignty of the vanquished nation. Treaties of surrender were not executed over one hundred
years after the conquest occurred.119
If Britain and/or Canada did not acquire sovereignty vis-à-vis Aboriginal peoples by
means of cession, prescription, or conquest, that leaves discovery as the only remaining option.
The Supreme Court of Canada seems uncomfortable with this result, given its statement in
Tsilhqot’in that the “doctrine of terra nullius (that no one owned the land prior to European
assertion of sovereignty) never applied in Canada, as confirmed by the Royal Proclamation
(1763)”.120 As John Borrows notes, however, “Canadian law still has terra nullius written all
over it.”121 It is true that since Calder, when Aboriginal title was recognized as an inherent and
thus a common law right, what is now Canada was not viewed as being utterly devoid of humans
at the time of European arrival. That being said, the doctrine of terra nullius is still operative.
The reason Aboriginal peoples have a mere burden on the Crown’s pre-existing and underlying
title, instead of sovereignty, is because the land was viewed as terra nullius, or in other words
empty of any people whose social and political organization was considered equal to that of
Europeans. As a result, Europeans could acquire sovereignty over Indigenous territory by means
of ‘discovery’ despite the presence of socially and politically organized Indigenous societies.
The only blemish on a title acquired by discovery is the ‘burden’ which has come to be known as
Aboriginal title. Thus, the doctrine of discovery and the principle of terra nullius are still
operative within Canadian law.122
As discussed at the beginning of this paper, the doctrine of discovery has been widely
criticized for enshrining in law the supposed inferiority of Indigenous peoples.123 I have
witnessed people, when confronted with this fact, argue in response that it is problematic to try to
hold societies of the past to today’s standards and values. Similarly, I have witnessed people
argue that Aboriginal peoples should ‘get over it’ because their complaints are about ancient
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history and one should look forward and focus on building a bright future rather than wallow in
the past. The problem with these responses is that they are factually incorrect. The doctrine of
discovery is not history; it is operative within Canadian law now. It is the current legal
explanation for why Aboriginal peoples have only Aboriginal title (if they can pass the hurdle of
satisfying the test for Aboriginal title) instead of sovereignty.124 Borrows demonstrates that this
issue is not merely academic when he traces the negative practical implications that flow from
characterizing Aboriginal title as a burden on the Crown’s underlying title acquired through
discovery.125 In this way, a deep prejudice exists at the heart of current Canadian law regarding
Aboriginal peoples.126
F

Conclusion
For those who value principles such as equality, consent, and respect, which are so

foundational to liberal democracies, the way forward is clear. As Justice Harry LaForme
explains,
the roots of the Aboriginal law tree are rotten and are incapable of
bearing anything that is sustainable. Our attempts to graft new and
creative branches on to this tree - as we have witnessed since 1982 - will
not bring health to the tree’s roots. I believe that nothing less than a new
approach is required, which includes discarding the false discovery
doctrine and all that grew out of it…127
The calls to expunge the doctrine of discovery and the concept of terra nullius from Canadian
law are growing, and include exhortations from the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,128
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,129 and the Truth and
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Reconciliation Commission.130 The only question that remains is: Do we as Canadians have the
courage of our convictions to do what we know is right?

GA Res 61/295 (UNGAOR, 61st Sess, Suppl no 49) (affirming in the preamble that “all
doctrines, policies and practices based on or advocating superiority of peoples or individuals on
the basis of national origin or racial, religious, ethnic or cultural differences are racist,
scientifically false, legally invalid, morally condemnable and socially unjust”).
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